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China faces a water scarcity problem that is severe by international stan-
dards. Many factors, including rapid urbanization and environmental degra-
dation etc, have been challenging the water service delivery in China. Since
water scarcity and quality have impact on the poor, reforms to the water ser-
vice provision can produce substantial improvements in the living standard of
the economically disadvantaged groups. The objective of this study is to crit-
ically evaluate the strengths and weakness of China's current water nancing
and delivering system, with a focus on safeguarding the interests of the poor,
and to oer insight into possible solutions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Rapidly increasing scarcity and deteriorating of quality of water resources
present a serious challenge to China. These problems, to a substantial de-
gree, are caused by demographic factors and economic growth, the processes
which one cannot easily control at will. Pressing environmental problem-
s call for radical policy measures to curb water demand and to increase
environmentally sustainable water supply.
The distribution of water in China is highly diverse. While Southern
China has abundant natural water resources, Northern China is naturally
arid and water is scarce. In addition, the more socially and economical-
ly prosperous regions have more serious water shortage problems, which
obstructs their economic development.
Currently, urban water prices in China hare handled with a single bill,
which includes the tap-water price (costs of pipe network construction and
maintenance), sewage treatment fee, water resource fee (benet areas are
also subject to the South-to-North Water Transfer Project Fund) and an
additional fee for urban public utilities. As of the end of 2010, the residen-
tial tap-water price in 31 capital cities was average 1.95 RMB/M3 and the
residential sewage treatment fee was 0.77 RMB/M3. Compared to other
countries, the water price as a percentage of family expenditures is still
relatively low in China.
However, policy changes may jeopardize the welfare of the poor if they are
not adequately protected. For instance, price increases in eort to dampen
the demand for water and enlarge availability of water in the medium-long
run can further limit the poor's access to water in the short run. Similarly,
increasing taris on industrial uses of water can discourage development.
This study proceeds as follows. Section two introduces the system of wa-
ter provision in China. Section three reviews government nancing of water
services. Section four explores issues in water administration, including ur-
ban areas and rural areas. Section ve explains water demand management
through price adjustments. Section six shows the access to water services
for the poor and the welfare eects of increased water charges. The last sec-
tion provides policy recommendations on low-cost eciency improvements
and water pricing policy.
2. THE SYSTEM OF WATER PROVISION IN CHINA
Water is a scarce resource in China. In 2008, the average per capita
availability of water was 2;100M3, which was almost one-fourth of the
world average (8;210M3 per capita) (Wu, Han, and Zhou, 2010). Water
scarcity in China is a function of a growing demand for the resource due to
industrialization and population growth, rapidly escalating levels of pollu-WATER SERVICE DELIVERY REFORM IN CHINA 473
TABLE 1.
Water resource and economic development in China provinces in 2008
Water resources per year per
































Source: Wu Peilin, Han Xue, Zhou Jinghua (2010), Regional Dierence of Water
Resource Stress in China: An Analysis Based on the Overall Well-O Society
Development Objective.
tion, and the geographic pattern of water distribution. Population growth
mounts substantial pressure on China's water resources, which | barring
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three percent decline in water availability occurred parallel to a twenty-ve
percent increase in population over the same period.1 At current popula-
tion growth rate, it was projected that by 2010, China's water availability
would fall below 2;000M3 per person, making China a \water-stressed"2
country.
Regional disparities in water availability are dramatic with the northern
regions severely starved. In the north, water availability rate as low as
964M3 per capita, falling below the water-scarcity level; in the south, water
availability is 3;208M3 per capita | a 4.2-fold gap. Average human water
use rate in the north was around 49 percent in 2000, while in the south it
was around 15 percent in the same year. Within the north region, the Hai
river basis is by far most intensively used at the rate of 95 percent, followed
by Huai and Huang basins exploited at 64 and 53 percent respectively.
As a result of heightened water consumption, the water ow in the river-
s has suered serious reduction. For instance, in the deltas of Hai and
Huang rivers have averaged 15 million M3 less than the amount required
to transport silt and to maintain estuarine and coastal environments. Over
utilization of the up-stream water resources has caused reduction in the
volume and quality of down-stream water supply (World Bank, 2002a).
Excessive diversion of surface water ows has been compensated at the
expense of increased exploitation of underground aquifers. Mining of aquifer-
s has been intensive, leading to substantial drops in groundwater tables of
around 90 meters in the Hai river basin and 100 to 300 meters in Beijing
(World Bank, 2002a). Mining of aquifers to satisfy current demands makes
them unavailable as a means of insurance during periods of drought and in
fact may contribute to drought. Depletion of groundwater has led to salt
water intrusion around the coast and subsidence in coastal and non-coastal
areas. Subsidence in turn causes damage to structures and undermines
ood protection.
Decient water supply is compounded by low water quality. Heavy pollu-
tion raises the cost of recycling water or makes it altogether impossible. In
2003, total municipal and industrial discharge reached 46 tons, three quar-
ters of which remained untreated. In 2003, over 38 percent of river waters
were polluted. In China's seven major river systems, in 70 to 80 percent
of the water, pollution level too high to allow any designated benecial use
(EIA, 2003).
1From 1983 to 2003, the population changed 1.03 to 1.29 billion, while water availabil-
ity changed from 2,849 to 2180m3=capita (China Statistical Yearbook, 2004 and Shalizi,
2006).
2According to the UNDP, UNEP, World Resource Institute classications, a coun-
try is considered \water-stressed" if its per capita natural water availability is below
2000M3; countries with water availability below 1000M3 per capita are classied as
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Urban and rural areas contribute approximately equal shares to the to-
tal water pollution. In the urban areas, municipal waste has become the
leading polluter followed by industrial pollution as the second largest con-
tributors. Due to intensive urbanization, municipal waste grew by 6.6 per-
cent increase in 2003 while industrial pollution increased at a much slower
rate of 2.4 percent in the same year. Construction of adequate sanitation
infrastructure could not keep up with the pace of the mounting population
pressure in the urban centers.
In the rural areas, the key sources of pollution are fertilizer and pesticide
runo as well as livestock production waste. China's (near) self-suciency
in grain production has been achieved due to heavy pesticide use, 317 kg per
hectare of cultivated land. Additionally, application of fertilizers have been
unbalanced (decient in potassium and phosphorus), often using inecient
methods; the quality of fertilizers has been low in many cases. China's
consumption of pesticides and fertilizers was 1.708 million tons and 54.044
million tons respectively in 2009 (Greenpeace, 2011); a substantial share of
them is highly toxic chemicals. Since most of rural water pollution comes
from non-point sources, it is hard to contain and has been largely outside
of government's control.
To summarize, the system of water provision in China is facing serious
challenges and requires immediate and radical modernization. The need
for reforms is more evident in the north where water provision increasingly
runs up against physical constraints (e.g. dropping water tables, etc.). On
the basis of the discussion above, it is clear that the water reform should
contain the following features: (1) It should emphasize management of
demand for water rather seeking to invest in increasing the supply alone.
Despite the heavy investment requirements, as a matter of coordination
and policy it is easier to address the problem of water scarcity from the
supply side. Yet this is not sustainable, management of water resources
should be leaning heavier toward management of demand. (2) On the
demand side policy interventions should address low eciency of water use
in agriculture and industry, promote water reuse, introduction of cleaner
technologies and monitor pollution. (3) Since urbanization has contributed
most prominently to water scarcity, close attention to urbanization patterns
should be paid, to avoid policies which encourage unsustainable rural-to-
urban migration; this is consistent, however, with the recent strategic shift
in China's economic policy toward rural development | from the point
of ecient water resource use, rural growth is largely favorable; similarly
migration toward smaller cities and town would promote water resource
sustainability as well. (4) Because of non-point nature of rural polluters,
achieving of ecient rural water use poses more serious coordination and
enforcement costs.476 DENIS NITIKIN, CHUNLI SHEN, QIAN WANG, AND HENG-FU ZOU
The need for environmental reforms has been materialized politically in
the form of environmental protest in response to environmental accidents
and disputes. According to Zhou Shengxian, head of the State Environ-
ment Protection Administration (SEPA), the incidence of mass protests
related to environmental concerns has been rising at the yearly rate of
almost 30 percent; protests have concentrated in economically developed
regions (China Daily, 2006). In 2005 alone, over 50,000 environment-related
disputes occurred last year. People protested against pollution as a result
of environmental mishaps in 97 percent of cases. Water contamination
specically made up 50.6 percent of the total accidents. The prospects for
the future are not comforting: unless eective measures are taken the scale
of environmental pollution | and unrest | will grow in proportion with
economic growth.
With these objectives in mind, we further consider scal and admin-
istrative aspects of reforms of the water sector, subject to an additional
constraint | concern for the interest of vulnerable households.
3. GOVERNMENT FINANCING OF THE WATER
SERVICES
In 2007, the total capital investment in xed assets from the water sector
was 102.65 billion RMB, of which the largest share, 41 percent, was dedicat-
ed to ood control, 41 percent was invested in water resource projects, and
7 percent spent on soil and water conservation and environmental manage-
ment. The total investment in the on-going capital construction projects
in the water sector reached 575.0 billion RMB by 2007. Out of 4,852 cap-
ital construction projects, 3,605 were funded by the central government
(MWR, 2008).
Completed investment in water resource projects centered on the phase I
projects of eastern and central routes of South to North Water Transfer, ru-
ral drinking water supply projects, projects for reconstruction of large-sized
irrigation districts, as well as water saving irrigation projects. However, on-
ly 1.9 out of 24.09 billion RMB was allocated toward rural drinking water
supply (MWR, 2005).
The central government invested 29.75 billion RMB in the water sector in
2004, roughly 37.6 percent of total public investment in the sector. Nearly
1=2 of central government water nancing were targeted for the central
region; the western region received 35.6 percent and the eastern region
received 14.6 percent. Forty-six percent went to the rural areas (MWR,
2006). Most of the central government's investment | 71.1 percent |
came from the special state debt fund and only 24.7 percent from budgetary
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So far China's dependence on foreign source of nancing of the water
sector has been considerable high. In 2002-2004, China's water sector
received a total of $583 million from development assistance committee
(DAC) donors. 69 percent of it was targeted to large water sanitation and
supply systems, 11 percent in river development and 6 percent in agricul-
tural water systems development. World Bank's share in water sector aid
to China amounted to over 41 percent; Japan's share exceeded 25 percent
(OECD-DAC, 2006). 3
Such substantial dependence of China's water sector on external fund-
ing is unsustainable and domestic investment in water must be developed.
Privatization of water provision is underway, but has progressed slowly.
Between 1998 and 2003 the public share in the total value added of the
water sector declined from 96 to 86.7 percent. In terms of employment, the
role of the public sector remained more prominent | it employed over 94
percent of the labor force.
As a result, private investment in water and sanitation in 199-2008 was
small, but in the recent years there has been a tendency toward an increased
participation by domestic private investors (Figure 1) as privatization of
the water sector advanced.
FIG. 1. Private investment in water and sanitation, % GDP
!
Source: Authors, based on data from World Development Indicators.
Sub-national share in the funding of water sector investments has been
considerable, around 65 percent. The role of local governments in man-
agement of these investments has been even greater | around 82 percent
3In 2000-2004 China's water sector received $275 million (in 2003 USD) in bilateral
aid from DAC donors, mostly Japan ($222 million). China accounted for over 11 percent
of DAC's total aid to water supply and infrastructure sector worldwide (Benn, 2006).478 DENIS NITIKIN, CHUNLI SHEN, QIAN WANG, AND HENG-FU ZOU
of investments in water were managed by sub-national government in 2004
(MWR, 2005). By law, local governments are not allowed to borrow from
markets and their access to nancing has been limited. The restriction is
frequently circumvented by encouraging water plants which have the status
of enterprises | albeit public ones | to borrow with implicit guarantees
from municipalities that the debt will be assumed by the municipal gov-
ernments, even if the contracting party to loans are the water enterprises.
To summarize, with respect to government participation in nancing of
the water sector, the following weaknesses can be identied: (1) Over-
all, expenditure on water infrastructure and services has not closed the
gap between supply of water and demand for it. (2) At the same time,
intergovernmental scal arrangement do not promote ecient service de-
livery; specically, the assignment of responsibility for direct infrastruc-
ture nancing to counties and prefecture fails to exploit economies of scale
and overburdens local government. (3) Dependence on external funding
and reliance on government debt-based nancing has reached unsustain-
able levels; it would be more eective to cultivate domestic and/or private
sector provision of water services. (4) Improved to business environment
| greater borrowing autonomy by enterprises and possibly by local gov-
ernments | will stimulate private participation and can help resolve the
chronic shortage of funds for costly water infrastructure investment.
4. ISSUES IN WATER ADMINISTRATION
The responsibility for urban water supply rests with the urban construc-
tion committees; National Development and Reform Commission (formerly
known as State Development Planning Commissions) at dierent levels of
government participate in the planning of development of xed assets and in
allocation of capital investment funds. Control over wastewater discharge
is exercised by the environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) at provin-
cial and municipal levels in administration. Some overlap exists between
the EPBs and urban construction committees because the former can also
sometimes initiate infrastructure development. Another instance of over-
lapping mandates in urban water resource management appears in cases
when city hydrology bureaus administer sewage treatment facilities.
All the water supply plants, the piping networks as well as municipal
water treatment facilities are publicly owned4 and operated in the vast ma-
jority of case, but since 1998 some plants and networks have been operated
4In those industries for which water quality requirements are unmet by the municipal
water supply and treatment network, industrial water supply plants and water treatment
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by private companies.5 The transfer of operation right to private parties
is however cumbersome since special authorization by the government is
required.
Water supply and wastewater treatment enterprises are increasingly ad-
ministered as institutionally separate entities, with wastewater treatment
enterprises operating within municipal administrations. Wastewater treat-
ment enterprises are not responsible for wastewater collection, which can
be operated by a dierent enterprise.
The degree of administrative control over the state-owned water supply
and treatment enterprises varies. Even though water utility enterprises
can now set the level of charges, they inevitably succumb to the pressure
from local government to keep fees well below the cost-recovery threshold,
leading them to operate at a loss.6 By contrast, wastewater enterprises do
not collect their own revenues from user fees; instead they calculate their
costs and submit their estimates to be included in the calculation of the
wastewater tari by the provincial governments.
Upon collection of the water fees | performed by the water supply utili-
ties or the municipal construction department | water enterprises transfer
receipts to the municipal budgets. These revenues are not earmarked and
there is no link between the preparation of the operation and capital bud-
get and the revenue collection (OECD, 2004). The single-billing for water
supply and treatment is a common practice in OECD countries. It is cost
| ecient since it is cheaper for water treatment companies to pay water
supply utilities a commission for the collection service than to establish
their own billing entities. On the other hand, the bundling of the two fees
on one bill improves collection rates for water treatment, since users' will-
ingness to pay for water treatment tends to be lower than their willingness
to pay for water supply.
Nevertheless, transfer of the water treatment share of the collected rev-
enues to the corresponding enterprises via municipal budgets introduces
substantial ineciencies | the charges thus remitted tend to not reach the
service providers. Municipal governments claim the revenue from wastewa-
5Six hundred sixty cities with the aggregate population in excess of 350 million is
serviced by own water supply plants. Municipal water supply piping reaches over 77
percent of urban residents (US Department of Commerce, 2005). Municipal wastewater
treatment facilities had been constructed in 310 out of 660 cities. But Majority of towns
| there are 1700 of them | still lack municipal water treatment facilities.
6The government often approves the rates, which are well below even direct business
costs. For example in Luzhou, the WWTP enterprise has recently proposed full cost re-
covery tari at the level of 0:95RMB=m3, and operational and maintenance cost-recovery
tari at 0:4RMB=m3. Following government-wide consultations, the rate approved by
the Price Bureau was only 0:2RMB=m3. There was no accompanying explicit legal com-
mitment as to who and how the resulting decit of wastewater enterprise will be covered
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ter treatment enterprises as their own, violating the principle of separation
of municipal ownership of shares and not of assets in public enterprises,
commonly used in OECD countries.
On the other hand, there are indications that municipalities have used
the lack of transparency in the single-billing system to charge wastewater
fees when they had no legal basis to do so. Municipalities which have no
water treatment facilities cannot charge water treatment fees, unless they
are planning to construct such a facility in three years' time. However,
monitoring of compliance with this law is dicult.
In rural areas, surface water irrigation schemes are mostly state-owned
and are administered largely by provincial and local government agencies.
The regulatory and water supply roles are played by the provincial govern-
ments under the strategic guidance of the national river basin commission.
Provincial water bureaus are involved in planning, design, monitoring, op-
eration, and construction of irrigation infrastructure and hydropower fa-
cilities and supply of water. The primary responsibility of prefectural
bureaus is construction and maintenance of the irrigation, ood-control
infrastructure and medium-sized reservoirs. Township-level bureaus share
responsibility for construction and maintenance of branch canals, ancillary
infrastructure and small reservoirs; township bureaus also collect water
fees. Village committees and individual farmers carry out the maintenance
of the eld canals.
Administration of surface water irrigation remains fragmented across a
large slew of agencies, whose responsibilities often overlap. The recently
advocated integrated management approach has promoted more parsimo-
nious distribution of irrigation administration7, but the organization matrix
still remains excessively complex, lacking cohesion and highly vulnerable to
the misallocation of resources (Ma, 2000). These considerations prompt-
ed the Chinese government to aggregate the functions of enforcement and
supervision over water conservation and supply and pollution prevention
within a single oce (MWR, 2005).
Overstang presents another challenge to the eciency of the public
irrigation infrastructure management. Privatization of the water sector
has proceeded at a rather slow pace and there is evidence that while the
economic size of the public water sector has declined faster than the number
of sta it employs maintaining substantial obligations to the employees
(pensions, medical insurance, and other subsidies).8 As in other public
7A number of provinces and municipalities | including Beijing, Shanghai, Hei-
longjiang, and Hainan | introduced integrated water management at provincial level.
China Water Investment Company has been established (MWR, 2006).
8Signicant eciency improvements could be made. For instance, while the public
share in the value added of the water sector is under 87 percent, public enterprises
account for 94 percent of the sector's employment (OECD 2005).WATER SERVICE DELIVERY REFORM IN CHINA 481
enterprises, suboptimal stang is motivated by considerations of political
and social stability. In the water sector, political and social pressure is
made more acute by the weakness of the private sector which in other
branches of industry and services has absorbed a large share of the laid-o
of the public enterprises.
The salaries of the irrigation sector employees are nanced from the
collected water fees. On the one hand, this gives water bureaus an incentive
to increase rates and to expand water supply in order to maximize revenue.
On the other hand, the overblown | due to overstang | wage bill of
the irrigation sector takes up all or almost all the revenue, leaving little for
infrastructure maintenance.
In addition to the obvious natural detrimental eect on the quality and
coverage of the irrigation infrastructure, nancing of salaries at the ex-
pense of infrastructure investment undermines the key linkage between wa-
ter charges and benet incidence in irrigation. Farmers simply do not see
any improvement in service delivery associated with their water payments.
Naturally this undermines farmers' willingness to pay for the irrigation
service and induces avoidance of water charges.
Mass creation of water user associations in rural area alleviated some of
these issues. World Banks' pilot projects indicate that they boosted water
users' participation in irrigation management leading to a number of pos-
itive consequences in pilot projects. They took on some of the functions
of the township and village water bureaus, specically water distribution,
collection of water fees and operation and maintenance of minor infrastruc-
ture installations. Serving as intermediaries between the township bureaus
and the farmers, water user associations facilitated resolution of conict
between farmers over water use; they also made collection of water fees
easier. Farmers' condence that the fees they pay will benet them (e.g.
invested in maintenance of local irrigation systems) increased. By 2004
there was already a network of 5000 of these associations (MWR, 2005).
In summary, a number of key issues gure prominently in water ad-
ministration. (1) Fragmented institutional framework and overlapping of
functions of dierent agencies introduce ineciency both in urban and rural
water service delivery, leading to misallocation of resources and, ultimate-
ly, higher cost of water service and lower returns on investment in water
infrastructure; in this regard introduction of the integrated management
framework is a welcomed development. (2) Despite the increased auton-
omy of the municipal water companies to set water prices, cost-recovery
of water services in rural areas has been low due to substantial pressure
from the governments to keep water charges low. (3) Ecient operation of
wastewater enterprises has been hampered by the poor denition of their
ownership over the revenue they generate. (4) Excessive involvement of
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remain a problem. Municipalities clearly benet from this control since
it generates extra revenue. (5) In irrigation, we observe a very similar
problem: water bureaus are dependent on water revenue for nancing of
their overblown sta, always to the detriment of infrastructure O&M. (6)
Such gaps in governance undermine users' trust in the fairness of water fees
and de-link charge from any perceived benet, undermining willingness to
pay and encouraging avoidance. (7) Lack of transparency in water charges
has given an opportunity to municipal governments to charge for services
they do not provide. (8) Overstang in the public water sector raises the
issue of downsizing which has not aected this sector all that much; this
problem will have serious welfare implications for the laid-o, but the ex-
cess labor force can be in part absorbed by the expanding investment in
infrastructure and the growth of the public sector. Positive practices are
also present in water administration: (9) Single-billing for municipal water
supply and wastewater treatment is a cost eective practice. (10) Water
users' associations promote participatory approach, increases transparency,
and ensures | albeit on a small scale | reinvestment of water fees into
local irrigation infrastructure. (11) Water markets in prepaid quantities of
water have been a success, but remain severely constrained by fragmented
at the level of irrigation district irrigation infrastructure.
5. WATER DEMAND MANAGEMENT AND WATER
PRICING
Water demand management is implemented using a number of instru-
ments. On the one hand, in 17 provinces, quotas on water use are in eect,
replacing uniform water fees with taris structures which vary according to
districts and projects. Adequate water pricing can (i) improve cost recovery
for the water services and, most importantly, (ii) curb the demand for wa-
ter, (iii) induce application of water-saving technologies in industrial water
use and in irrigation, and (iv) increase the wastewater reuse potential.
Chu et al. (2004) demonstrates non-linearity in the price elasticity of
water demand. This suggests that price that small price increases will not
produce the desired eect on water consumption. Price increases should be
considerable to encourage wastewater reuse. Specically any price change
on irrigation water below 0.162 RMB per cubic meter produces no notice-
able eect on reuse potential; price increase in the 0.162-0.237 RMB range,
on the other hand, cause non-linear jumps in reuse rates (fourteen-fold).
Industrial thermal power water reuse rates respond to price increases in
a non-linear fashion as well | at the level of 0.95 RMB per cubic meter,
reuse rates increase six-fold.WATER SERVICE DELIVERY REFORM IN CHINA 483
A water pricing reform was introduced in 2000, despite a considerable
resistance at various levels of government to raising the water fees, a move
which is considered political dangerous and unaordable.
Prior to the reform, in 1999, in 36 large and medium-sized cities, water
cost 0.14 USD. Water fees accounted for only .5 percent of household in-
come, well below the commonly used 4% aordability benchmark and even
substantially lower than the rates charge in other developing and transition
economies (Figure 2).

































































































































































































































Source: Authors, based on data from World Bank (2005) and OECD
(2005).
After the reform prices increased, their levels reected availability of
demand for water. The prices on December 2010 in all capital cities are
reported in Table 2 and 3.
The level of the water supply tari is set by prefectures. Wastewa-
ter treatment fees are levied by the provinces. The current levels of the
wastewater treatment fees | ranging USD 0.02 to .07 in the select cities in
table 1 | fall below the actual cost of a secondary wastewater treatment
plant (US Department of Commerce, 2005).
Twelve cities have introduced a three-tier progressive volumetric pricing
scheme, which aects municipal and industrial users. Shanghai is expected
to transition to volumetric water pricing in the second half of 2006 as well.
Dierential rates are applied to three classes of residential users according
to the volume of water consumption: below 180, 180 to 300 and over 300
cubic meters per month. Eighty percent of households fall below the180
threshold (Shanghai Daily, June 23, 2006).
In rural areas, low water prices undoubtedly contribute to ineciencies
in irrigation water use. At low cost of irrigation, farmers' incentive to484 DENIS NITIKIN, CHUNLI SHEN, QIAN WANG, AND HENG-FU ZOU
TABLE 2.
Tap Water Price (RMB/ M3)
Secondary Administrative Tertiary Special
Capital City Province Residents Industry Units Industry Industry
Hefei Anhui 1.55 1.8 1.8 1.81 7.24
Beijing 2.96 4.44 4.12 4.66 60
Chongqing 2.7 3.25 2.7 3.25 3.25
Fuzhou Fujian 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 3
Guangzhou Guangdong 1.32 1.83 1.61 2.71 3.38
Nanning Guangxi 1.48 2.23 2.23 2.23 5
Guiyang Guizhou 2 2.5 2.5 3.3 10
Haikou Hainan 1.6 2.5 1.8 2.5 2.5
Shijiazhuang Hebei 2.5 3 2.8 3.5 24
Harbin Heilongjiang 2.4 4.3 4.3 4.3 16.4
Zhengzhou Henan 1.6 2 2 3 9.2
Wuhan Hubei 1.1 1.65 1.5 2.35 4.8
Changsha Hunan 1.21 1.38 1.21 2.2 4.2
Huhhot Inner Mongolia 2.35 3.5 3.5 4 20
Nanjing Jiangsu 1.5 1.85 1.7 1.85 2.95
Nanchang Jiangxi 1.18 1.45 1.45 1.65 6
Changchun Jilin 2.5 4.6 4.6 8 16
Shenyang Liaoning 1.8 2.5 2.6 3 10.2
Yinchuan Ningxia 1.6 2.28 1.75 2.28 18.08
Xining Qinghai 1.3 1.38 1.65 2 4.5
Xian Shaanxi 2.25 2.55 2.95 3.4 16.1
Jinan Shandong 2.6 2.9 2.6 4.3 16
Shanghai 1.63 2 2 2 10.6
Taiyuan Shanxi 2.4 2.7 2.7 3.5 14
Chengdu Sichuan 1.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 10.5
Tianjin 3.5 6.3 6.3 6.3 20.7
Lhasa Tibet 0.6 1.4 1 1.2 1.5
Urumqi Xinjiang 1.36 1.48 1.48 2.44 8.7
Kunming Yunnan 2.45 4.35 3.6 4.35 14.1
Hangzhou Zhejiang 1.35 2.1 2.1 5.15 2.1
HongKong 4.16 4.16 4.16 4.16 4.16
Macao n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Taibei Taiwan n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
conserve water are weak. At the same time, low prices have interfered with
cost recovery and have not been able to support infrastructure maintenance
and rehabilitation. Farmers' irrigation costs consist of a combination of two
or three of the following four components: payment to water authorities forWATER SERVICE DELIVERY REFORM IN CHINA 485
TABLE 3.
Waste Water Treatment Price (RMB/ M3)
Secondary Administrative Tertiary Special
Capital City Province Residents Industry Units Industry Industry
Hefei Anhui 0.51 0.59 0.59 0.77 0.77
Beijing 1.04 1.77 1.68 1.55 1.68
Chongqing 1 1.3 1 1.3 1.3
Fuzhou Fujian 0.85 1.1 0.85 1.5 1.1
Guangzhou Guangdong 0.9 1.4 1.2 1.4 2
Nanning Guangxi 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Guiyang Guizhou 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Haikou Hainan 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
Shijiazhuang Hebei 0.8 1 1 1 1
Harbin Heilongjiang 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
Zhengzhou Henan 0.65 0.8 0.8 0.8 1
Wuhan Hubei 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Changsha Hunan 0.65 0.8 0.7 1.28 1.18
Huhhot Inner Mongolia 0.65 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
Nanjing Jiangsu 1.3 1.55 1.5 1.55 1.65
Nanchang Jiangxi 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1
Changchun Jilin 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.8 2
Shenyang Liaoning 0.6 1 1 1 1
Yinchuan Ningxia 0.7 1 1 1 2
Xining Qinghai 0.52 0.63 0.57 0.95 1.15
Xian Shaanxi 0.65 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Jinan Shandong 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
Shanghai 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
Taiyuan Shanxi 0.5 0.8 0.5 1 1
Chengdu Sichuan 0.8 1.4 1.4 1.4 4.5
Tianjin 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Lhasa Tibet n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Urumqi Xinjiang 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Kunming Yunnan 1 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25
Hangzhou Zhejiang 0.5 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.5
HongKong n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Macao n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Taibei Taiwan n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Source: www.price.h2o-china.com.
water supply; payment to collectives for the construction and maintenance
of local water irrigation infrastructure; cost of water pumping equipment
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Irrigation takes two forms according to the source of water: surface irri-
gation and ground water irrigation. Provincial governments levy at area-
based charges on surface water irrigation. The charge for groundwater
irrigation consists of a xed fee farmers have to pay in order to dig a well.
These irrigation fees have been steadily increasing, but have not been able
to dampen the demand for water; instead these fees give water administra-
tion as well as the farmers the reason to increase consumption of water.
Recall that water bureaus nance administrative expenditure | most
importantly the payment of sta salaries | from water fee revenues. Con-
sequently, water bureaus have a strong incentive to increase rates and to
expand water supply in order to maximize revenue.
From the farmers' point of view, the current system of water charges
fails to give an incentive to conserve water. The at fee on irrigation
taxation | based on the size of the irrigated plots | severs the link between
the payment for water and the amount of water consumed. This is why
increased irrigation taris have failed to induce farmers to switch to more
ecient irrigation technologies. In fact, Yang et al. (2003, p. 155) argues
that the eect of the increasing at irrigation charges has been to (a) lower
the prot margins of the agricultural producers, for which they sought
to compensate by (b) increasing water consumption instead of reducing
it. On these grounds, it is absolutely necessary to combine increased water
pricing with volumetric calculation of irrigation charges. Emphasis on more
eective collection of water fees can raise the water revenue, but will fail
to improve water conservation.
Levies on groundwater use are one-time charges on the drilling of the
wells and do not establish any correspondence between the cost of water
and the volume used. However, by contrast with surface water irrigation,
the farmers using groundwater irrigation (a) have more control over the
volume of water use and the choice of water withdrawal technologies; and
(b) have de fact control over the water resource with a much clearer sense
that ecient water use will allow longer use of the resource. In groundwater
irrigation, excessive water use is more due to the lack of monitoring over
well-digging and restrictions on the volume of groundwater use must be
integral to any scal policies. However, the enforcement of the well fees has
been weak and the groundwater use has been determined solely by farmers'
nancial constraints and the availability of water. As a result, groundwater
irrigation remains poorly regulated and generates little public revenue.
Recently, in a number of irrigation districts water markets have been
introduced, when farmers can prepay for given volume of water (minimum
10 cubic meters). Farmers then can sell their water use rights for that
amount to other farmers. Water markets then contain a mechanism which
can encourage more sustainable water use. However, in most cases the
extent of the market is limited by the size of the irrigation district, due toWATER SERVICE DELIVERY REFORM IN CHINA 487
the physical limitations of the irrigation infrastructure. Local governments
in the Heihe river basin have introduced subsidies on water-saving irrigation
methods in the amount of $632/ha for pipe irrigation and $1,807/ha to
encourage sprinkle and drop irrigation (Chen et al., 2005). These subsidies
should be better targeted to poor farmers.
Non-linearity in the price elasticity of water demand indicates that be-
yond a certain threshold price increases can lead to disproportionately large
rise in water reuse. This suggests that price increases should be sizable to
stimulate water reuse; however, in order to protect the welfare of the poor
households, a safety net should be designed, centered on targeted transfer-
s/subsidies. Transfers should be calculated on the basis of household (or
per capita) income or consumption and not on the basis of water user.
To summarize, (1) prices on water have been steadily increasing from the
very low levels which could not sustain any meaningful level of expansion,
or even maintenance, of infrastructure. (2) Price increases on irrigation
water did not reduce consumption because the charge was related to area
irrigated and not the volume of water; consequently, introduction of vol-
umetric pricing in irrigation is necessary. (3) In urban areas progressive
volumetric pricing in being introduced. (4) In agriculture, increasing water
fees without an opportunity to modify consumption is likely to seriously
undermine the protability of agricultural production and lower the liv-
ing standards in the countryside. (5) Introduction of subsidies for ecient
irrigation methods is also an eective mechanism. (6) In groundwater ir-
rigation, there are substantial eciency gains to improved monitoring and
enforcement of licensing.
6. PROVISION OF WATER SERVICES AND ITS IMPACT
ON THE POOR
Reforms in the water sector have been underway to resolve shortages
in water supply and inadequate water quality. Reforms involve multiple
dimensions, numerous institutional actors and stakeholders. They have di-
rect and indirect eects on the poor. On the one hand they can directly
improve (or worsen) their access to water services; and on the other, the
manner in which the reforms are implemented | the costing of water ser-
vices, subsidies (or lack thereof) to poor households, etc. | will aect the
cost of living and the welfare; yet thirdly, reforms in the water sector will
have economy-wide repercussion, especially for the growth in agriculture.
Increased pricing of water can raise the supply and quality of water, if
tari increases are introduced wisely. To the extent that improved cost re-
covery will increase construction of new water delivery infrastructure and
improve operation and maintenance (O&M) of the existing facilities, in-
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| can improve equity in the access to water services. As Hussein (2004)
points out, low uniform water charges lead to underinvestment in the irri-
gation infrastructure leading to overall deterioration of water supply, which
becomes particularly inadequate at the tail ends, i.e. in underdeveloped re-
mote locations, those where poverty is particularly pervasive (World Bank,
2001, World Bank, 2003).
However, they can directly worsen the condition of the poor as they raise
cost of living. Water price increases can also slow down the growth in those
sectors of economy which heavily rely on water, most importantly in agri-
culture, where the prot margins are narrow (Ministry of Agriculture, 2000)
to begin with, and where the poor are predominantly employed. Therefore,
while price reform is necessary it should be complimented with (a) public
transfers toward the poor and (b) commitment to ensure equitable access
to improved water supply by the poor.
Not surprisingly, the poor are disproportionately aected by water scarci-
ty and lack of sanitation. Between 1990 and 2002, the access to improved
water source had grown 10 percent for the country as a whole; by 2002, 77
percent of Chinese had access to an improved water source and the sanita-
tion coverage rate reached 44 percent (up from 24 in 1990). Nevertheless,
there is a sizable urban-rural gap in access to these services.
In the rural areas the problems of inadequate access to drinking water
and sanitation are more acute than in the urban areas. In 2002 in the
urban areas, the rate of access reached 92 percent, while in the rural area
it was around 68 percent; sanitation coverage rate in the rural areas was
less than 1=2 of the urban rate in 2002, 29 versus 69 percent, respectively
(WHO-UNICEF, 2006). To the extent that poverty is concentrated in
rural area, the urban | rural dierential in access to water and sanitation
disadvantages the poor.
Among rural residents the poor are still more disadvantaged | accord-
ing to the 2000 China's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) rural house-
hold survey, 65 percent of rural households had access to safe drinking wa-
ter, while among the rural poor9 the rate of access was 58 percent (ADB
2004).10 The same survey reveals dramatic regional variation in the access
of the rural poor to water resources. While in Tianjin, Beijing and Liaoning
over 90 percent had access to safe drinking water, in Tibet, Guizhou and
Chongqing, the access rates were 5, 21, and 26 percent respectively. Van
9The poor are dened as people living in households with per capita consumption
expenditure below 860 yuan.
10By contrast, the rates of access to electricity among the rural poor and non-poor
were not signicantly dierent, 97 and 98 percent respectively (ADB 2004), reecting
the fact that provision public services which required substantial infrastructure invest-
ment expanded at a slower pace. Public infrastructure construction relied heavily on
sub-national governments' budgets which lacked scale to undertake substantial lumpy
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der Tak (2002) estimated that in the aggregate water scarcity and pollution
disproportionately aect the poor with 30 percent of the impact of water
pollution and scarcity concentrating on the poor,11 aecting 260 million of
China's poor.
In the urban areas the problem of access is less severe. Nevertheless,
despite a nationwide increase in access to water, in the urban areas access
rates dropped 9 percent between 1990 and 2002. Urbanization has outpaced
provision of adequate water service. Among urban residents, migrants from
the rural area are most heavily aected by the lack of access to water. They
settle in areas with poor housing which often remain disconnected from
the city water grids. This has been largely recognized in China's national
poverty reduction strategy. From the outset, the 8-7 Poverty Reduction
Program12 included provision of drinking water for people and livestock in
the ocially designated poor counties as one of its objectives Sangui et al.
(2004) reported that during the years of the 8-7 Program, drinking water
for 53.5 million persons and 48.4 million animals in the ocially designated
poor counties.
Most of the investment in rural water infrastructure under the 8-7 Pro-
gram was carried out through the food-for-work initiative. 10 billion RMB
in central government funds was invested into the expansion of cultivable
land and small scale irrigation systems; and 3.5 billion RMB were invested
in digging wells, building pipelines, collecting rain water and building dams
or small ponds for drinking water; additional 1.5 billion RMB were spent
on controlling soil and water erosion along small rivers; and 9 billion RMB
went into road construction, which also improved access to water.13
Although the impact of the food for work (FFW) programs is undeniably
important, these programs suered from under-nancing due to the lack
of counterpart funds. Undoubtedly, the contribution of the food for work
program to rural infrastructure development and maintenance has been sig-
nicant. Nevertheless the program has suered from excessive devolution
of nancing responsibilities to sub-national governments. While the central
government nanced inputs to infrastructure development, provincial and
county government have to provide matching funds for the labor contri-
bution. Frequently budget constraints limit their ability to fund the labor
11Van der Tak (2002) dened households as poor if their expenditure fell under $1.25
per day
12In 1994, the government introduced the \8-7 Plan" (National Plan for Poverty
Reduction), aspiring to lift the majority of the remaining 80 million poor above the
government's poverty line during the seven-year period 1994|2000.
13As a result, 30 million mu of improved land and 40 million mu of land with new
or improved irrigation were added, solving the drinking water problem for 30 million
persons and 40 million animals; the soil and water erosion of 30 thousand sq. km of land
was treated, and 100,000 km of roads were constructed or received maintenance (NBS,
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costs and have tried to compensate for the lack of nances by recruiting
voluntary workers, counting the time worked on FFW projects toward the
work day contribution requirement.
Welfare eects of increased water charges
OECD's (2004) aordability analysis of increased municipal water charges
in connection with prospective wastewater treatment construction in Sichuan
province indicates that aordability was not a real concern (see table 4).
In the 14 towns and cities they studied the current water charges in 2000
accounted for .6 to 3.1 percent of household income and in most towns
the share was below 2 percent. The share of water fees in the income of
the bottom decile was above the 4 percent aordability threshold in the
majority of the location. In two locations 40 percent of the population fell
below the aordability threshold. Clearly increase in the price of municipal
and residential water will disproportionately aect the bottom deciles of
the population.
According to the World Bank's survey conducted in Sichuan province
residents in connection with the Sichuan Urban Environment Project, re-
vealed reasonable willingness to pay for water charge increases (World
Bank, 1999). Conceivably willingness to pay will increase as household
incomes grow and if users notice improvements in service delivery as result
of increased water fees.
Irrigation taxation in its current form negatively aects the average
growth in the agricultural sector and also has an unfavorable eect on
agriculture. We have already noted that price elasticity of irrigation water
demand is very low, leading to increased consumption of water by the farm-
ers in response to the at water fee increases. Unable to lower their water
costs by reducing water use, the farmers have to seek to oset the nega-
tive eect of the fee increase on their agricultural incomes through more
intensive irrigation. The farmer faces a choice between a more intensive
water use and lower protability and decline in welfare. Therefore, the at
irrigation fee can potentially reduce the welfare levels in the rural sector,
contributing to rural poverty.
As a result of inadequate scal structure of the water administration
which does not deliver the benets to those who bear the cost of irriga-
tion, there are serious equity concerns. Not only do the water charges cut
into farmers' incomes, they do not deliver the public good they purport to
nance and consequently amount to income redistribute away from the ru-
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TABLE 4.
Aordability of combined water and wastewater bills to dierent income
groups in selected cities in Sichuan Province in 2000
Decile
Share of average
household income 1 2 3 4 5
Luzhou City 0.9% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1%
Leshan City 1.2% 4% 3% 3% 2% 1%
Meishan City 1.6% 6% 5% 4% 2% 2%
Yibin City 1.0% 4% 3% 2% 1% 1%
Changning County 1.8% 5% 4% 3% 3% 2%
Gao County 3.1% 9% 7% 6% 4% 3%
Zigong City 2.1% 6% 4% 4% 3% 2%
Fushun County 1.5% 4% 3% 3% 2% 2%
Neijiang City 3.0% 9% 7% 6% 4% 3%
Weiyuan County 0.6% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1%
Zizhong County 2.0% 5% 4% 3% 2% 2%
Ziyang City 0.8% 3% 2% 2% 1% 1%
Jianyang City 1.9% 5% 4% 3% 3% 2%
Linshui County 0.8% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1%
Note: (1) Cell shaded green (orange) indicates the household income deciles,
where water and wastewater bills exceeded ve (four) percent of dispos-
able household's income. Four percent benchmark is commonly used in
OECD countries as the threshold of aordability; the ve percent aordabil-
ity benchmark was recommended by consultants to the Asian Development
Bank for China. (2) The share of water charges in the household income of
the top 50 percent | not presented here | is less or equal to 3 percent.
Source: Adapted from OECD (2004); simulations by project team.
signicantly more disadvantaged than their urban counter parts. This is
yet another14 instance of regressive distribution of public benets.
Overall, in terms of water service delivery, we observe the following reg-
ularities: (1) Rural areas have lower access to improved water supply and
sanitation than the urban ones. (2) At the same time the coverage rate in
the urban areas has dropped considerably since 1990, indicating that cities
have grown faster than their water supply systems. (3) Deciencies in the
urban water supply likely aect the migrant population disproportionate-
ly. Migration to large urban centers (Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin) has
been increasingly unsustainable and measures should be taken either to
discourage it or to direct the rural migrants to smaller cities. (4) Poverty
Reduction Strategy has been successful in improving water service infras-
14Historically, the below-market mandatory pricing of agricultural products amounted
to a regressive net tax on the rural population and a subsidy for the urban residents,
who beneted from low cost of food.492 DENIS NITIKIN, CHUNLI SHEN, QIAN WANG, AND HENG-FU ZOU
tructure in the designated poor counties, but its contribution is conned
to small-scale interventions which could be accomplished by the eorts of
the unskilled village or township population labor force; constraint of local
budgets could not accommodate sizable investment requirements of large
water infrastructure which could exploit economies of scale.
7. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The central concern of the water public administration strategy is to
address water scarcity. For environmental reasons, measures which purport
to manage demand for water should be emphasized. Alleviation of water
scarcity will benet the poor, but the current distribution of access to water
supply and sanitation warrants concerted eorts | like the one undertakes
within the Poverty Reduction Strategy framework | to target poor areas.
However, eorts should be made to provide sucient funding for targeted
infrastructure construction in poor areas to enable construction of facilities
capable of exploiting economies of scale.
Additionally, water management should account for a number of vulner-
abilities in provision of water service: lower access to water supply and
sanitation in rural areas than in urban ones; declining coverage rate in the
urban areas which suggests that cities have grown faster than their water
supply systems; and deciencies in the urban water supply which are like-
ly to aect the migrant population disproportionately. Migration to large
urban centers has been increasingly unsustainable and measures should be
taken either to discourage it or to direct the rural migrants to smaller cities.
Management of demand for water should be carried out within a com-
prehensive framework which eliminates technological, organizational and
institutional ineciencies through a series of reform, without over-reliance
on price mechanisms alone. The direct costs of eliminating ineciencies |
especially institutional and organizational ones | are likely to have lower
direct cost for the poor.
Low-cost Eciency Improvements
Apart from concerns about aordability and equity of the eect of price
increases, the analysis in the previous sections point to several reasons why
price increases may not promote water conservation. Specically, relatively
low-cost eciency improvements suggested by the analysis above should
include the following measures:
First, with regard to agricultural technologies, use of more environmen-
tally friendly pesticides and fertilizers could be subsidized. Second, in
terms of nancing, improve expenditure assignments between levels of gov-
ernment to correct incentives and to enable scale-appropriate investment.
Further de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operation of water facilities. Third, a series of steps are necessary to en-
hance governance in the public sector: (a) limit the control of municipal
governments over the revenue ows of wastewater treatment enterprises;
limit the ability of local water bureaus to nance its operating costs di-
rectly from water charges (even though a certain relationship between the
amount of revenue collected and the amount of revenue appropriated could
be necessary to stimulate collection rates | a tax farming arrangement of
a sort) at the expense of nancing infrastructure. (b) Eliminate overlap-
ping mandates of dierent government agencies. (c) Further support water
user associations, giving them specic mandates, especially with regard
to collection of water fees. (d) Expand the practice of water markets in
pre-paid water-tender. (e) Further explore the option of allowing farmers
to trade or exchange their water rights across irrigation districts. (f) In-
crease monitoring and enforcement of licensing in groundwater irrigation.
(e) Overstang in the public water sector raises the issue of downsizing
which has not aected this sector all that much; this problem will have
serious welfare implications for he laid-o, but the excess labor force can
be in part absorbed by the expanding investment in infrastructure and the
growth of the public sector.
Finally, as for business environment, create a possibility for private do-
mestic and foreign participation. Participation of foreign partners in Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) deals could be particularly advantageous, given
that the user-pays nancing options are not aordable or look problematic
on equity grounds, and the option of \creditor-pays" seems more feasible.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that user-pays-like schemes which include the
cost of prospective water infrastructure construction in current water bill
requires better governance practices at the municipal level.
Water Pricing Policy
Even with all the eciency improvements, demand management using
price adjustments is a necessary option. Water pricing policy should have
the following features. (a) Pricing of water in irrigation should be vol-
umetric to give an incentive to farmers to conserve water (current price
is base on irrigated area) and to avoid squeezing farm prot margins too
tight lest to discourage rural growth. Apart from the obvious welfare eect
rural growth slows down rural-to-urban migration. (b) The practice of vol-
umetric pricing in urban area should be extended and variable block taris
used. (c) Subsidies to low-volume users | specically progressive block
charges | are eective from the point of view of reducing water demand,
but are not necessarily sensitive to welfare levels. Poor households already
consume water at the subsistence levels and cannot save by further reduc-
ing consumption. This is also problematic on the grounds of fairness: is
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consumption of such basic goods as water? Additionally, the results of the
water cost aordability study indicate that even with a reasonable block
tari structure, bottom deciles are disproportionately aected by the price
increase. We also know that income inequalities have been steadily growing
in China over the last few years, to promote equitably aordable water use
the structure of block taris would have to be revised to account for such
distributional changes, which will likely be politically dicult and organi-
zationally cumbersome. All of this suggests that subsidies based on the
volume of consumption should be complimented by targeted welfare-based
subsidies.
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